OCHA. Palestine. Humanitarian Situation Report | 1 May 2026. Palestina. Situación humanitaria. 1 mayo 2026 ENG ESP

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OCHA. Palestine.  Humanitarian Situation Report | 1 May 2026
02 May 2026

Contents

    Highlights
    Overview
    Gaza Strip
        Lack of Engine oil and Spare Parts
        Incoming Supplies
        Fuel
    West Bank
        Casualties and Settler Attacks
        Access to Education
        Displacement
        Humanitarian Impacts of Raids and Other Operations
    Funding
    Annexes
        Annex 1: Humanitarian Operations in the Gaza Strip by Cluster

Highlights

    Four months into 2026, just over 10 per cent of the funding required to provide critical humanitarian operations this year has been secured.
    In Gaza, two NGO workers were killed in separate incidents, triggering the suspension of health and water services.
    Restrictions on the entry of generators, engine oil, and spare parts are driving widespread system failures, reducing health and sanitation services, debris removal, and the movement of humanitarian teams.
    In the West Bank, 2026 has so far recorded the highest monthly average of people displaced due to lack-of-permit demolitions in over 17 years for which UN records are available.
    Israeli forces and settlers killed four Palestinians, including two children, between 21 and 27 April, and a Palestinian woman died of injuries sustained during an Israeli operation in 2023.
    Settler attacks on education are increasing pressure on rural families to leave their homes and communities.

Overview

Humanitarian conditions across the Occupied Palestinian Territory remain dire and often life-threatening, while humanitarian action continues to be constrained. Conditions affecting the operating environment range from import restrictions and impeded movement of UN agencies and NGOs into and within the territory, to strikes and other disruptions affecting service delivery. Within overcrowded displacement sites, women consistently report feeling unsafe due to inadequate lighting, which significantly increases gender-based violence risks, especially at night. Meanwhile, funding remains critically low, with less than 10 per cent of the required resources secured so far in 2026.

Gaza Strip

Most people across the Gaza Strip remain displaced, in poor shelter conditions and exposed to rising public health risks linked to pests and rodents, as well as ongoing strikes, shelling, and gunfire. They remain largely confined to less than half of Gaza, unable to access other parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, namely the West Bank, or to travel abroad, except for the very small number of patients approved for medical evacuation and their companions.

The second half of April saw continued strikes and exchanges of fire. Many of these incidents occurred in residential areas, resulting in civilian casualties and otherwise affecting civilians and services on which they rely.

On 26 April, an aid worker from the non-government organization (NGO) Ard El Insan was shot and killed in Gaza. In a social media post, Ard El Insan reported that he was killed next to his workplace and during working hours. This NGO provides medical services with support from the Humanitarian Fund, which OCHA manages on behalf of the Humanitarian Coordinator (see the funding section below). The organization says it has suspended services while a security assessment is underway.

On 20 April, an airstrike reportedly hit NGO workers at a water well in Gaza city – killing one person and injuring four others, heavily damaging the well, and triggering the suspension of on-site work. Activities also remain suspended at Al Mansoura filling point, where two civilian truck drivers contracted by UNICEF were killed on 17 April (see last week’s report).

    According to the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Cluster, these suspensions did not immediately lead to a decline in water production. Despite severe constraints, partners have so far been able to offset these setbacks by increasing the volume of water extracted from alternative sources and delivered by truck. However, the WASH Cluster stresses that people’s water needs remain far from being met, with about 60 per cent of families facing difficulties in securing enough clean water.
    Also according to the WASH Cluster, current arrangements are costly and unsustainable, as they depend heavily on items that are scarce or require extensive engagement with the authorities to secure approval for their entry into Gaza (see below). These items include fuel, lubricating oil, generators, consumables, spare parts, and trucks. Equipment is also urgently needed to repair the pipe network, which has been destroyed and is assessed to be at a point of collapse.
    The WASH Cluster estimates that moving water by truck from desalination plants to cover the needs of communities affected by the suspension of activities at Al Mansoura filling point costs an additional US$30,000 per day.

As of 29 April, OCHA had recorded the killing of at least 593 aid workers in Gaza since October 2023, including eight since a ceasefire was announced on 10 October 2025.

Between 13 and 25 April, the UN-led Joint Rapid Distribution Mechanism provided full multi sectoral assistance packages to 14 households, primarily in response to domestic fire incidents. Each package includes a tent or three tarpaulins, nylon rolls, hygiene kits, baby cereal, clothes and bedding items.

Lack of Engine oil and Spare Parts

Restrictions on the entry of essential items – including generators, engine oil, and spare parts for vehicles and rubble‑removal machinery – are having a cumulative and increasingly severe impact on humanitarian operations and service delivery in Gaza. A prolonged shortage of engine oil and spare parts, previously mitigated through reuse, is no longer manageable and critical systems are now failing.

Operational capacity is steadily deteriorating as vehicles and generators break down beyond repair, undermining humanitarian mobility, power supply, and service continuity. The shortage has already disrupted food distributions, water trucking, ambulances, dispatch of educational supplies and the medical cold chain.

The shortage has already led to widespread vehicle and generator breakdowns, directly affecting food collection and distribution and daily bread production. Generator failures are affecting hospitals, including intensive care units.

As of 21 April, only 16 sewage pumping stations out of 73 were operational, resulting in the discharge of approximately 40,000 cubic metres of sewage per day into the sea, residential areas, and groundwater. Debris removal capacity has dropped sharply – from approximately 25,000 tons per day to about 5,000 tons – due to non-functional heavy machinery. Constraints are also affecting armoured vehicles used for field missions and emergency responses, increasing risks for humanitarian staff. Generator limitations are further affecting facilities critical to staff safety, including the 24/7 Gaza Security Operations Centre managed by the UN Department of Safety and Security, which relies on uninterrupted power for security communications and incident monitoring.

Continued delays in allowing the entry of generator oil and spare parts risk a rapid collapse of essential services. Telecommunications infrastructure may further deteriorate, undermining humanitarian coordination, emergency communications, and digital cash assistance, including the functioning of financial service providers. Hundreds of generators, water wells, desalination plants, pumping stations, and tanker fleets are at risk of irreversible failure. Without immediate access to lubricant oil and spare parts, safe drinking water production and trucking may cease, significantly heightening the risk of public health emergencies and disease outbreaks. The few remaining functional agricultural wells and irrigations systems are at risk of shutting down, which could hinder the already fragile resumption of local food production.

Incoming Supplies

Between 21 and 30 April, according to UN 2720 Mechanism data retrieved at 16:00 on 30 April, approximately 21,000 pallets of UN and partners’ aid were offloaded at the Kerem Shalom and Zikim crossings. This brings the total number of pallets offloaded between 1 and 30 April to over 50,300, compared with about 47,500 in March, 54,700 in February, and 58,300 in January.

The lower offload volumes in March were largely attributable to crossing disruptions linked to the regional escalation, with all crossings closed between 28 February and 2 March and Zikim in the north remaining sealed for humanitarian aid collection until 13 April.

With regard to collections, between 1 and 30 April, over 45,700 pallets of UN and partner’s supplies were uplifted into the Strip for further distribution to people in need, including 19,200 in the last nine days.

On the commercial front, data shared by the Gaza Chamber of Commerce with the Cash Working Group suggests that between 20 and 26 April, 397 private sector truckloads were collected into Gaza. The commercial supply chain remains highly volatile. For instance, on 24 April, no commercial truckloads entered and on 21 April, only one entered – according to that dataset. This volatility significantly reduces vendors’ ability to predict restocking capacity. Of the 397 commercial truckloads, 172 reportedly comprised food supplies, 51 shelter materials and 17 hygiene items, while 157 contained commodities classified as “other,” largely non-essential consumer goods such as chocolate-hazelnut spread and instant coffee. Assessments indicate that lower volumes of commercial products are let in, the higher the proportion being of non-essential items – likely driven by higher profit margins for wholesalers.

When assessing markets as a whole, there are growing concerns regarding the availability, quality, diversity, and affordability of non-food items, which are essential for multi-sectoral humanitarian responses.

Regarding prices, potatoes, apples, and cucumbers continue to increase, while most other food commodities have stabilized or begun to decline following the spike linked to the recent regional escalation. Non-food items have shown similar trends of stabilization or gradual price decreases. Nevertheless, both food and non-food prices remain largely unaffordable, with the cost of living calculated at 282 per cent of pre-war levels, alongside daily price fluctuations of up to 10 to 15 per cent.

The UN is only able to confirm the entry of supplies tracked by UN 2720. For further breakdowns of those, see the online UN 2720 Mechanism Dashboard.

For a detailed account of the latest humanitarian operations in Gaza, see Annex 1 below.

Fuel

Between 22 and 29 April, UNOPS facilitated the entry of 730,000 litres of diesel into Gaza and distributed almost 835,000 litres (including from stocks that entered before that period) in support of humanitarian operations.

The following are among the challenges facing fuel entry:

    Information shared between the Israeli authorities, Egyptian authorities, and private sector suppliers is often conflicting. Resulting in lack of clarity and time necessary to verify and adapt, has often consumed the already narrow operating window at the Kerem Shalom crossing.
    Delays are further compounded by the current two-step notification process, which requires formal notification from the Israeli side to the Egyptian side before entry is authorized. Unclear processes regularly add several hours to each convoy and limit operational flexibility.

Inside Gaza, fuel storage capacity remains severely constrained. While UNOPS has identified a viable fuel station with adequate storage capacity, utilizing this fuel station hinges on approval from Israeli authorities, which has been pending for more than one month. Until this location is authorized, limited storage continues to force inefficient, short-cycle resupply movements and increases dependence on daily access through Kerem Shalom.

These storage limitations also affect distribution. Without approved locations to pre-position fuel near areas of high demand, the distribution network remains highly sensitive to minor delays, congestion, or disruptions at currently functioning stations.
West Bank

Across the West Bank, the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate amid a sustained increase in settler violence, operations by Israeli forces, and movement restrictions. These dynamics are driving casualties, displacement, and damage to homes and critical infrastructure, while further constraining access to livelihoods and essential services, including education. Vulnerable communities – particularly in Area C, East Jerusalem, and refugee camps – are increasingly exposed to a coercive environment that heightens protection risks and drives displacement. Humanitarian partners continue to respond through emergency assistance, protective presence, psychosocial support, and service provision, including efforts to sustain access to education.

Casualties and Settler Attacks

Between 21 and 27 April, Israeli forces shot and killed a Palestinian child in Nablus city during an Israeli forces raid, and Israeli settlers shot and killed three Palestinians, including one child, in two separate incidents in Al Mughayyir and Deir Dibwan both in Ramallah governorate, and injured others, including children; one of these incidents took place in the vicinity of a school during the school day. In addition, a Palestinian woman died of injuries sustained in 2023 during an operation carried out by Israeli forces in Jenin Camp. This brings the total number of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces or settlers in 2026 up to 27 April, to 42, including 10 children and two women.

On 29 April, after the reporting period, in two separate incidents, Israeli forces shot and killed two Palestinians, including one child, in two raids in Ramallah and Hebron governorates.

Al Mughayyir village in Ramallah governorate has been increasingly exposed to recurrent attacks by Israeli settlers, particularly those believed to reside in the Adei Ad and other surrounding settlement outposts, alongside intensified operations carried out by Israeli forces.

    Since mid-2024, the establishment of multiple new settlement outposts in the vicinity, including one in the northwestern part of the village, in Area B, has heightened pressures on the community, also affecting nearby villages such as Khirbet Abu Falah and Turmus’ayya. This has further intensified a coercive environment characterized by recurrent violence, access restrictions, and risks to Palestinian livelihoods – all of which jointly pressure residents to leave their homes and communities.
    Since January 2023, OCHA has documented at least four displacement incidents in Al Mughayyir due to settler attacks, in which a total of 113 Palestinians, including 57 children, were forcibly displaced. These include a large-scale incident in April 2024 that led to the displacement of 86 people following a violent settler attack involving the burning of residential houses, vehicles and agricultural structures, and widespread destruction of property and livelihoods. Subsequent incidents reflect repeated displacement of smaller herding households: in August 2024, two households comprising 10 people were displaced after Israeli settlers set fire to residential tents and damaged donor-funded structures; in January 2025, a herding household of seven people was displaced after Israeli settlers, accompanied by Israeli forces, raided the area, damaged shelters and forced the family to leave under threat; and in February 2026, two herding households comprising 10 people were forcibly displaced after Israeli settlers attacked and damaged their shelters, rendering them uninhabitable.

So far in 2026, OCHA has documented 17 settler attacks affecting Al Mughayyir – an average of about five incidents per month – marking a sustained increase compared with a monthly average of one to two incidents over the preceding three years, and following a sharp escalation in 2025, when about 40 settler attacks resulting in casualties or property damage were recorded. These incidents resulted in Palestinian casualties, widespread property damage, and significant agricultural losses, including the burning and vandalism of cultivated land, the uprooting of olive trees, and the killing of livestock. Incidents that did not cause casualties or damage are not included in this count, although they too are assessed to be part of the coercive environment driving displacement.
   

Since 2017, 11 Palestinians have been killed in Al Mughayyir, including at least six in the context of settler attacks, with a notable concentration of fatalities in recent periods, including four in 2025 and so far in 2026. This reflects a shift not only in the frequency of incidents but also in their severity.

Between 21 and 27 April, at least 57 Palestinians, including seven children, were injured, including 37 by Israeli settlers in settler attacks and 20 by Israeli forces mainly within the context of search operations and other raids by Israeli forces or settlers. Seventy per cent of Palestinians injured by Israeli settles during settler attacks (26 out 37) were reported in two attacks on 21 and 27 April in Beit Imrin and Jalud villages, both in Nablus governorate; Israeli settlers, believed to be from nearby settlement outposts, injured at least 26 Palestinians, including three children, and at least seven houses and four vehicles sustained damage.

During the same period, OCHA documented at least 30 Israeli settler attacks against Palestinians that resulted in casualties, property damage, or both, bringing the total number of attacks since the beginning of 2026 to over 700 in over 200 communities. This is an average of six incidents per day.

Access to Education

Since January 2023, the Education Cluster documented a sustained pattern of Israeli settler attacks affecting education across the West Bank, including raids on schools, vandalism of classrooms and equipment, intimidation of students and teachers, obstruction of access to schools, and damage to related infrastructure. Among 45 fully displaced communities due to recurrent settler attacks and related access restrictions, ten had schools that have been fully abandoned; of these, eight have been vandalized and two were subsequently demolished after being abandoned.

These attacks have affected already vulnerable Bedouin and herding communities in Area C, where schools have been established to serve remote communities. In several cases, attacks have disrupted classes, forced temporary closures, damaged donor-funded facilities, or contributed to the displacement of communities, further undermining children’s access to education. The Education Cluster recently noted that the demolition of Al-Maleh School in Hammamat al Maleh in April followed months of repeated vandalism, theft and attacks, and “effectively ended any remaining possibility of educational access within the community.” The school had served children from surrounding Bedouin communities in the northern Jordan Valley. For further information on this demolition, see last week’s report.

In the northern West Bank, 10 UNRWA school facilities out of 38 in the area face access restrictions. In Jenin Camp, four UNRWA school buildings remain inaccessible. As a result, about 1,600 students have been temporarily relocated to alternative learning spaces outside the camp; these students attend three days of in-person classes per week and one day of remote learning, in line with UNRWA’s current four-day school week due to financial constraints. In Tulkarm Camp, four UNRWA school buildings.

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